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Abstract
This article reports on a study into epistemic strategies used in the trial on the 2010 Polish 
Air Force Tu-154 air crash which took the lives of many high-ranking Polish officials in-
cluding the President of Poland. It follows the KUB model proposed by Bongelli and Zucz- 
kowski (2008), in which three epistemic stances are distinguished: Knowing, Unknowing 
and Believing. Taking into account the political context of the trial, the study focuses on 
the ways in which the witness, Poland’s former Prime Minister Donald Tusk, communi-
cates his knowledge (certainty), unknowledge (neither certainty nor uncertainty) and be-
lief (uncertainty). As the data reveal, when referring to the circumstances of the crash itself, 
the witness most willingly communicates unknowledge and belief while his declarations 
of certitude (knowledge) concern mostly procedural matters which are not directly re-
lated to the crash. As regards the explicit marking of (un)knowledge with the verb wiedzieć 
(‘know’), both wiem (‘I know’) and nie wiem (‘I don’t know’) are used rather sparingly. By 
contrast, phrases including references to the witness’s memory (e.g. to, co mam w pamięci 
[‘what I can remember’]) – marking either unknowledge or limited/uncertain knowledge 
(belief) – resurface as the witness’s preferred strategy. The data also demonstrate frequent 
co-occurrences of ‘knowing,’ ‘unknowing’ and ‘believing’ markers, reducing the overall de-
gree of certainty communicated by the speaker. In sum, the study reveals how Poland’s 
former Prime Minister skillfully avoids unequivocal or categorical answers and conveys 
a low degree of certainty in his testimony.
Keywords
epistemicity, epistemic stance, evidentiality, Polish courtroom discourse, Polish Air Force 
Tu-154 air crash
Streszczenie
Artykuł przedstawia wyniki analizy strategii epistemicznych stosowanych przez świadka 
podczas przesłuchania związanego z katastrofą smoleńską. W analizie wykorzystano model 
KUB (Bongelli and Zuczkowski 2008) zakładający istnienie trzech stanowisk epistemicz-
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nych: Wiedzy (Knowing), Niewiedzy (Unknowing) i Przekonania (Believing). Głównym ce-
lem badania była identyfikacja środków językowych, za pomocą których świadek, były pre-
mier Polski Donald Tusk, komunikuje swoją wiedzę (pewność), niewiedzę (ani pewność, 
ani niepewność) oraz przekonanie (niepewność). Stwierdzono, że odnosząc się do oko-
liczności katastrofy, były premier Polski najchętniej komunikuje niewiedzę i przekonanie. 
Osądy, które można zaklasyfikować jako deklarację posiadania wiedzy (pewność), dotyczą 
z kolei głównie kwestii administracyjnych niezwiązanych bezpośrednio z katastrofą. Usta-
lono ponadto, że w zeznaniach świadka formy ‘wiem’ i ‘nie wiem’ występują dość rzadko. 
Preferowaną strategią okazały się natomiast odwołania do braku lub niepełnej pamięci (np. 
‘to, co mam w pamięci’), które sygnalizowały, odpowiednio, brak wiedzy (niewiedzę) lub 
ograniczoną wiedzę (przekonanie). W analizowanym materiale zauważono także częste 
współwystępowania znaczników ‘wiedzy,’ ‘niewiedzy’ oraz ‘przekonania,’ obniżające ogól-
ny poziom pewności komunikowany przez świadka. Reasumując, badanie pozwoliło na 
identyfikację strategii, za pomocą których w swoim zeznaniu były premier Polski zręcznie 
unikał udzielania jednoznacznych odpowiedzi oraz komunikował niski poziom pewności.
Słowa kluczowe
epistemiczność, ewidencjalność, polski dyskurs sądowy, stanowisko epistemiczne, 
katastrofa smoleńska1. Introduction
The communication of knowledge has long been an object of scholarly inquiry. 
Assessing the epistemic status of information – or else, the linguistic mark-
ing of certainty and uncertainty – has been the focus of numerous analyses of 
naturally occurring data. While psychologists centre on the speaker’s mental 
state, discourse analysts examine its linguistic manifestation. In other words, 
they look at the various ways in which speakers lay claim to epistemic priority 
and negotiate alignment in interaction. This is all the more interesting in judi-
cial and political settings, where – it may be argued – interactants consciously 
employ a wide range of strategies in order to display the desired degree of cer-
titude or ambiguity.  
Intrigued by the interplay between law and politics in a recent high-pro-
file court case involving the former Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk, 
I have embarked on an analysis of his testimony which some commenta-
tors believe was a masterful political performance. Though no charges were 
brought against Mr Tusk himself, he testified amidst the accusations levelled 
against him by his political rivals, blaming him and officials in his government 
of the time for the 2010 Air Force Tu-154 air crash. Assuming that the highly 
politicised context of the hearing and the fact that it was broadcast live would 
have a bearing on the strategies of epistemic positioning pursued by Mr Tusk, 
I sought to examine the devices he used – while testifying under oath and, at 
the same time, addressing his political opponents – to admit to having certain 
or uncertain knowledge, or to having no knowledge at all. The analysis follows 
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the KUB model (Bongelli and Zuczkowski 2008; Zuczkowski and Bongelli 
2014), in which three epistemic stances are distinguished: Knowing, Unknow-
ing and Believing.2. Epistemic stance revisited: Knowing, Unknowing and Believing
Although it may be stating the obvious, whenever speakers contribute to 
a conversation, they are driven by the desire to give or receive (i.e. share) in-
formation (Heritage 2012a: 79). How they value the veracity or reliability of 
the information, in turn, is a matter of their epistemic positioning. Put sim-
ply, epistemic stance (or epistemicity) refers to the speaker’s commitment to the 
truth of the proposition being communicated and as such it is a linguistic no-
tion rather than a psychological one. In the words of Biber et al. (1999: 972), 
epistemic markers can signal “certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, or lim-
itation; or they can indicate the source of knowledge or the perspective from 
which the information is given.” Elsewhere, epistemicity is viewed as “interac-
tional and linguistic means by which discourse participants display their cer-
tainty or doubt toward some state of affairs or a piece of information in their 
own turn, or in the turns of others” (Keisanen 2007: 257).
The degree of certainty or doubt projected in interaction depends on the 
source of information and the manner in which it was obtained. While for 
some, the indication of the source of knowledge – which, admittedly, is con-
ceptually different from the assessment of this knowledge  –  should be sub-
sumed under a distinct linguistic category, i.e. evidentiality (see, e.g., Aikhen-
vald 2004), others are inclined to encompass both the source of information 
(mode of knowing) and the speaker’s assessment of the information under one 
notion, i.e. epistemicity (see, e.g., Chafe 1986).1 It is the latter – broader – posi-
tion that is adopted in the current study.
As is obvious, varying degrees of certainty or uncertainty are associated 
with a number of lexical and grammatical markers (see, e.g., Kärkkäinen 2003; 
White 2003; Martin and White 2005; Cornillie and Pietrandrea 2012; Nuck-
olls and Lev 2012). Given the recent profusion of studies into epistemicity and 
its various manifestations (see, e.g., Cornillie 2009; Aikhenvald 2018; Boye 
1  This understanding of epistemicity is not shared by all scholars. For instance, Boye (2012), 
who offers a functional-cognitive perspective on epistemic meaning, argues that epistemicity 
is a notional supercategory which consists of the subcategories of evidentiality and epistemic 
modality. In this view, evidentiality (or epistemic justification) is understood as the source of 
information/evidence/justification whereas epistemic modality (or epistemic support) is defined 
as the degree of certainty/degree of commitment (Boye 2012: 2). Epistemicity, on the other hand, 
receives the status of justificatory support (cf. Toulmin 1958: 112).
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2018), it is hardly surprising that there is no consensus as to the degree of 
certainty/uncertainty that individual markers encode, especially if one con-
siders the properties of these markers, their context-dependence, multifunc-
tionality and the varied rhetorical strategies they serve. An alternative view 
is, however, offered by Zuczkowski and Bongelli (2014), who – taking a con-
versation-analytic perspective – propose that regardless of their surface reali-
sations, the stances speakers take in interaction can essentially be reduced to 
three positions: Knowing, Unknowing or Believing. The Knowing position, 
as the authors argue, refers to what the speaker communicates as certain in-
formation basing on what he/she perceives (evidentiality) or deducts/infers 
(epistemicity). The Unknowing position, conversely, denotes the speaker’s lack 
of knowledge or awareness of the information in question which is thus re-
garded as neither certain nor uncertain. Finally, the Believing position, it is 
proposed, describes the speaker’s beliefs, opinions, assumptions and doubts 
or, in other words, all information that is possible, probable or uncertain, re-
gardless of the degree of uncertainty that is being expressed (Zuczkowski and 
Bongelli 2014: 127–128).
That said, a caveat is in order here: the KUB model does not purport to ac-
count for what speakers actually know (epistemic status); rather it aims to de-
scribe what they declare to know (epistemic stance) in a communicative act.2 
As a consequence, intentionally misleading or deceitful communication – i.e. 
withholding the information one has to appear less knowledgeable than one 
really is or providing an untrue account of a state of affairs with a view to 
misinforming the listener – and the speaker’s mental state or actual knowl-
edge are not accommodated. It should too be noted that speakers may dem-
onstrate high certainty and commit themselves to the truth of the proposition 
they communicate for manipulative purposes. Such examples abound, for in-
stance, in high-stake encounters in political and judicial settings, where the 
knowledge displayed in interaction may promote or harm the speaker’s in-
terests. To explain how speakers employ a variety of markers to enhance their 
credibility in the eyes of the audience and to reveal the pragmatic motivations 
behind their use, the analyst needs to look at the interactional context and the 
co-occurring items. Admittedly, though, when applied in analyses of sponta-
neous interactional data, full of messy or incomplete sentences, false starts, re-
dundancies and, finally, clusters of ‘certain’ and ‘uncertain’ markers, the KUB 
categories may not be as easy to assign as initially intended. Lastly, it may not 
2  As Heritage (2012b: 7) proposes, epistemic status is “based upon the participants’ evalu-
ation of one another’s epistemic access and rights to specific domains of knowledge and infor-
mation” and it differs from epistemic stance which is “encoded, moment by moment, in turns 
at talk.” Lymer et al. (2017), however, question the usefulness of epistemic status, calling it “an 
unwarranted theoretical construct” and wondering “how one might gather evidence to support 
any particular assignment” of this status.
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go amiss either that the degree of certainty of the whole utterance often differs 
from the degree of certainty inherent in the semantic meanings of individual 
epistemic markers (this will be demonstrated later in the article).
Notwithstanding the above, in what follows, I will look at how the KUB 
epistemic positions are manifested – and skillfully juggled – in Polish court-
room data, focusing on the linguistic choices made by the witness, who as 
a prominent political figure not only accounts to the judicial authority but 
also tries to defend (if not promote) his public image by demonstrating a low 
level of certainty regarding the circumstances that led to the 2010 Polish Air 
Force Tu-154 air crash and consistently avoiding unequivocal or categorical 
answers.3. Epistemic stance in Polish courtroom discourse: 
A case study3.1. Data
The data used in this study come from a two-and-a-half-hour-long hearing in 
the lawsuit concerning the organisation of the official visit of the Polish Pres-
ident Lech Kaczyński in Katyń, where he was to commemorate the 70th an-
niversary of the Soviet massacre of Polish officers in WWII. The lawsuit was 
brought against Tomasz Arabski, the head of the chancellery of the then Prime 
Minister of Poland Donald Tusk and it concerned his role in the organisa-
tion of the visit as well as his alleged responsibility for the Polish Air Force 
Tu-154 air crash.3 Donald Tusk, now the President of the European Council, 
testified as a witness before a three-judge panel at a Warsaw court explain-
ing both his involvement in the preparation of the visit and the role of offi-
cials in his government of the time. Though no charges were brought against 
Mr Tusk himself, he seemed to have already been condemned by his politi-
cal opponents blaming him for the air crash and trying to denigrate him in 
the eyes of potential voters. The hearing was broadcast live, with the press be-
ing present in the courtroom, and it turned into a political show. Mr Tusk an-
swered the questions prepared by the counsel as well as the questions asked 
by members of some of the families of the crash victims. It is believed here 
that the circumstances of the hearing and, in particular, its highly polit-
icised context, had a bearing on the strategies of epistemic positioning that 
Mr Tusk pursued.
3  The video with the hearing was accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_SZG-
tOjODE (date of first access: 4 May 2018) and transcribed for the purpose of this study.
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3.2. Analysis
Taking the KUB model as a point of departure, I semi-automatically analysed 
the transcript from the hearing looking for candidate examples which could be 
ascribed to the Knowing, Unknowing or Believing position. Given the purpose 
of the study, I focused only on the witness’s turns with a view to identifying the 
strategies he pursued when making (de facto public) statements concerning his 
knowledge and I excluded from the analysis the contributions made by other 
participants. Again, it should be reiterated that – despite that fact that the wit-
ness testified under oath – from a linguistic point of view the epistemic mark-
ers found in the testimony could only be interpreted as the witness’s declara-
tion or display of knowledge and not necessarily as a reflection of his actual 
mental state. The overall aim of the study was to examine the linguistic expres-
sion of epistemic stance in Polish courtroom discourse (which, in this case, 
became public discourse) and, further, to create a taxonomy of KUB markers 
which would facilitate future analyses of Polish interactional data. In the en-
suing analysis, for reasons of space, only selected examples are discussed (for 
a comprehensive categorisation of epistemic markers, see Appendix 1).   
3.2.1. Na całym świecie wiadomo… – KNOWING position
As it transpired, the data yielded a fair number of instances where the witness 
laid claim to certain knowledge. These, it should however be noted, were not as 
varied and frequent as instances of Unknowing and Believing. It should too be 
stressed, more importantly perhaps, that these markers concerned procedural or 
administrative matters, not directly related to the plane crash. Thus, it may be ar-
gued, Mr Tusk intended to show his competence and knowledge of “how things 
are done” in politics. Still, looking at the specifics, the canonical marker of cer-
tain knowledge, i.e. wiem4 (‘I know’) was used rather sparingly (9 tokens). What 
is more, it tended to co-occur with some form of hedging or mitigation (e.g. ale 
wiem (‘but I know’); no wiem, że [ale nie wiem] (‘well, I know that [but I don’t 
know]’); wiem z racji kontekstu (‘I know because of the context’)). Two of the un-
mitigated examples of wiem are shown below. While in (1), wiem appears to be 
a neutral declaration revealing the speaker’s actual knowledge, ja wiem in (2), in-
cluding the first-person pronoun ja (‘I’) foregrounds the speaker’s perspective.5
4  It might be added here that English I know may have two translations in Polish: wiem or 
znam. While the first form means “I know (that)” or “I have knowledge about something,” the 
second one means “I know someone/something” (cf. German ich weiss and ich kenne). In 
the data under study, both forms were identified.
5  Given that Polish is a pro-drop language, the inclusion of the first-person pronoun is not 
necessary (Polish verbs are marked for person). When the pronoun is, however, used, it is done 
for pragmatic purposes, e.g. to stress the speaker’s perspective and/or stamp his/her authority.
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(1) Wiem, że Wysoki Sądzie to nie jest satysfakcjonująca odpowiedź dla tych, którzy 
wierzą że…
(‘I know, Your Honour, that this is not a satisfactory answer for those who believe 
that…’)
(2) Ja wiem kto odpowiada za różne części mojej wizyty.
(‘I know who is responsible for different parts of my visit.’)
Other examples of Knowing stances included items whose inherent mean-
ings denoted the speaker’s conviction or lack of doubt (see Table 1). Consider 
the markers found in (3) and (4), which, in line with the KUB model, are to be 
taken as signs of certain knowledge. While they indeed may reflect the speak-
er’s conviction, one should also allow for a divergent interpretation, namely 
that of an uncertain speaker excessively stressing certainty in order to con-
vince a doubting audience (especially if objections are expected).6 It may also 
be the case that such items as na pewno (‘certainly’) or z całą pewnością (‘most 
certainly’) are just routinised stancetaking practices which do not necessarily 
convey a high degree of certitude.7 They also lose their strength when com-
bined with ‘uncertain’ markers, as in the response in (4), where instead of sim-
ply saying yes, Mr Tusk produces a series of ‘uncertain’ markers, i.e. znaczy 
(‘I mean’), no (‘well’) and powinny być (‘there should be’).
(3) Z całą pewnością to ma odbicie w dokumentach.
(‘This is most certainly reflected in the documents.’) 
(4) Q: Ja rozumiem, że są notatki sporządzone z tego?
A: Znaczy no z całą pewnością powinny być.
Q: (‘I understand that there are notes documenting this?’)
A: (‘I mean, well, most certainly there should be [some].’)
Another subcategory of ‘certain’ markers identified in the witness’s testimo-
ny included references to obviousness and common knowledge.8 Examples of 
such items are shown in (5) and (6), where  – while invoking the shared epis-
temic background –  the speaker obviates the need to provide the source of the 
information and, at the same time, seeks alignment and the audience’s approval.
6  Cf. Halliday’s (2004: 625) paradox that “we only say we are certain when we are not.” This 
may be illustrated by the difference between the unqualified declaration to jest w stosownej do-
kumentacji [‘this is in relevant documents’] (marking high certainty) and the qualified statement 
to jest na pewno w stosownej dokumentacji [‘this is certainly in relevant documents’] containing 
a high certainty lexical marker which, paradoxically, may be a sign of the speaker’s uncertainty.
7  In the data there were 13 tokens of z całą pewnością and they were all used by the witness.
8  A similar category is introduced by Bednarek (2006) in her model of epistemological posi-
tioning, i.e. “the linguistic expression of assessments concerning knowledge.” In her view, bases 
of evidence include: “Perception,” “General knowledge,” “Proof,” “Obviousness,” “Unspecified,” 
“Hearsay” and “Mindsay.”
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(5) ale na całym świecie wiadomo, że tego typu zachowania na pokładzie samolotu, czy 
przed lotem mogą doprowadzić do tragedii…
(‘but it is known worldwide/it is common knowledge that this kind of behaviour 
on board a plane or before a flight may lead to a catastrophe...’)
(6) Zdaje się i to przecież nie pierwszy raz i wszyscy wiemy, znamy okoliczności politycz- 
ne także tej wizyty.
(‘It seems, and this is not the first time, and we all know, we are all familiar with 
the political circumstances also of this visit.’)
The last two linguistic manifestations of Knowing to be discussed in this 
section include the unqualified declarative sentence and epistemic future. In 
(7), it is the very design of the sentence that suggests the witness’s high com-
mitment to the proposition. Adding anything apart from the proposition itself 
seems superfluous since by uttering these words, the witness avers the whole 
utterance, thus conveying an almost absolute certainty (whether it is objective-
ly true or not is a different matter). On the other hand, the certainty of powiem 
(‘I will say’) in (8) is boosted by the co-occurring verb podkreślam (‘I say’/‘as 
I’m saying’) which also conveys the speaker’s conviction.  
(7) Odpowiedzialne za to, gdzie i jak ląduje samolot, są służby.
(‘Where and how the aircraft lands is the responsibility of the services.’)
(8) te kontakty są częstsze, ale mają charakter taki powiem bardzo rutynowy podkreślam 
nie polegają na tym, że ktoś kogoś nie odstępuje na krok.
(‘this co-operation is more frequent, but it is, I will say, very much like a routine, 
as I’m saying, it doesn’t mean that one person follows another round all the time’)
Summing up, the markers which signalled the Knowing position includ-
ed the verb wiedzieć used in the first person singular or plural, as well as sev-
eral other items pointing to the speaker’s conviction or lack of doubt (for se-
lected examples, see Figure 1). However, although the markers themselves 
marked high certainty, in some contexts, their interplay with less certain mark-
ers decreased the certainty of the whole utterance produced by the witness.
wiem dokładnie, że (‘I know exactly that’)
mam świadomość, że (‘I am aware of the fact that’)
jestem przekonany, że (‘I am convinced that’)
nie mam żadnych wątpliwości, że (‘I have no doubts that’)
na pewno (‘certainly/for sure’)
na całym świecie wiadomo, że (‘it is known worldwide that/it is common knowledge that’)
z całą pewnością (‘most certainly’)
wszyscy wiemy, znamy (‘we all know, we are all familiar with’)
z natury rzeczy (‘by its/their very nature’)
jest oczywiste, że (‘it is obvious that’)
powiem (‘I will say’)
Figure 1. Selected markers of the Knowing position identified in the data
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3.2.2. Nie mogę tego ani potwierdzić, ani … – UNKNOWING position
The Unknowing position turned out to be more visible in the data than was the 
Knowing position, especially in the utterances related to the circumstances of 
the crash. At the same time, somewhat surprisingly, the most obvious mark-
er of ‘unknowledge’, i.e. nie wiem (‘I don’t know’) was identified in Mr Tusk’s 
turns only 14 times. All the remaining instances of admitting to ‘unknowl-
edge’ were represented by a wide array of items, most of which included nega-
tion (see Figure 2). The utterances shown in (9) and (10) illustrate negation of 
a ‘knowing’ mental verb used in the first person singular, suggesting the speak-
er’s strong identification with the claim being made.
(9) Szczerze powiedziawszy nic nie wiem o zapasowych samolotach.
(‘To be honest, I don’t know anything about back-up aircraft.’)
(10) ...po prostu nie kojarzę w tej chwili tego, czym się zajmowali
(‘… I just cannot recall at the moment what they were doing.’)
The example shown in (11), in turn, contains the object pronoun mnie 
(‘me’), which, just like the possessive pronoun mojej (‘my’) in (12), indicates 
the speaker’s greater epistemic distance. When contrasted with verbs in the 
first person singular, phrases containing object and possessive pronouns signal 
a reduced level of agency and as such, they may be seen as the witness’s attempt 
to dissociate himself from the message conveyed.9
(11) Mnie na ten temat też nic nie wiadomo.
(‘I know nothing about this, either.’)
[literal translation: ‘Nothing is known to me about this.’]
(12) nie jest w mojej wiedzy nic, co uprawniałoby mnie do oceny pracy…
(‘I am not aware of anything that would entitle me to assess the work of ..’)
[literal translation: ‘There is nothing in my knowledge that …’])
Along the same lines, the impersonal structure in (13) acts as a distancing 
mechanism which allows the witness to attribute his lack of knowledge to ob-
jective factors.
(13) to też proszę sprawdzić, bo tego typu rzeczy też umykają z pamięci
(‘please check this as well because such things also escape one’s memory’)
9  Consider the difference between I believe (= a high level of agency) and it is my belief 
(= a reduced level of agency) in English.
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Another distancing strategy which the witness pursued was claiming – in 
lieu of a straightforward “I don’t know” – that he may not answer a question 
because of the manner in which it was formulated, as in (14).
(14)  Wszystko, co na ten temat miałem do powiedzenia powiedziałem. Nie jestem w stanie 
na tak postawione pytanie dodać czegokolwiek nowego.
(‘I have already said everything that I had to say about this. I am not able to add 
anything new [in response] to a question so formulated.’)
Finally, by analogy to the Knowing position, Mr Tusk also deployed men-
tal and communication verbs to convey his lack of knowledge, as demon-
strated in (15) and (16), with the latter example illustrating epistemic future 
as well.
(15)  chociaż nie wykluczam, że kiedyś miałem je w rękach, ale nie mogę tego ani 
potwierdzić, ani…
(‘although I do not rule out the possibility that I once had the documents, but 
I can neither confirm this nor…’)  
(16) Dzisiaj nie powtórzę dokładnie tego spotkania
(‘Today I won’t be able to give a precise account of this meeting’)
In sum, the Unknowing position was expressed by a large group of mark-
ers signalling varied degrees of commitment on the part of the witness. Men-
tal and communication verbs in the first person singular represent the top 
of the scale whereas phrases with object and possessive pronouns along-
side impersonal structures – the bottom of the scale. It was also quite re-
markable that Mr Tusk seemed to avoid admitting to ‘unknowledge’ with 
the words “I don’t know.” Instead, he used a range of distancing strategies 
which pointed to a reduced level of agency and which seemingly excused 
him for failing to provide the expected answer. On the other hand, the wit-
ness consistently blamed his poor memory for not being able to recall the 
required details.10
10  In total, Mr Tusk referred to his (or one’s) memory 64 times. In the phrases containing 
the noun pamięć (‘memory’) or the verb pamiętać (‘remember’), he either stressed complete 
lack of knowledge (as in nie pamiętam (‘I don’t remember’)), nie mam w pamięci niczego takiego 
(‘I don’t remember anything like this’) or the fact that the knowledge he had was uncertain or lim-
ited (as in jeśli dobrze pamiętam (‘if I remember this correctly’), według mojej pamieci (‘as far as 
I remember’), to, co mam w pamięci (‘what I can remember’)). Most of these phrases expressed 
the Unknowing or Believing position.
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nie wiem (‘I don’t know’)
nie wykluczam (‘I cannot rule out the possibility’)
po prostu nie kojarzę (‘I just cannot recall’)
nie pamiętam (‘I don’t remember’)
nie przypominam sobie (‘I cannot recall’)
nie znam odpowiedzi na to pytanie (‘I don’t know the answer to this question’)
nie mam w pamięci niczego takiego (‘I don’t remember anything like this’/[‘I do not have it in my 
memory’])
nie mogę tego ani potwierdzić, ani… (‘I can neither confirm this nor…’)
nie jest w mojej wiedzy (‘I don’t know’/[‘it is not in my knowledge’])
mnie na ten temat nic nie wiadomo (‘I don’t know anything about this’/[‘nothing is known to me about 
this’])
mi też nie jest łatwo ocenić, co pamiętam (‘I also find it difficult to assess what I remember’/[it is not easy 
for me to assess what I remember])
tego typu rzeczy umykają pamięci (‘such things escape one’s memory’)
nie powiem (‘I won’t say’)
Figure 2. Selected markers of the Unknowing position identified in the data
3.2.3. Chyba, jak sądzę, jeśli dobrze pamiętam… – BELIEVING position
The last of the three epistemic stances was represented by markers which re-
flected the witness’s beliefs, assumptions or conjectures (= I believe p), or 
doubts and unsupported claims (= I don’t know whether p [or non p]) and 
which, again, were related mostly to the circumstances of the crash. The first 
thing to note is the absence of ‘believing’ mental verbs, with the exception of 
(nie) sądzę (‘I [don’t] think’). Contrary to what might be justifiably assumed, 
the witness’s use of mental verbs to mark the Believing position was rather in-
frequent (see Table 1). Instead, as noted earlier, Mr Tusk repeatedly stressed the 
fact that his memory was incomplete and this seemed to be his preferred strat-
egy during questioning.11
As regards the most frequent ‘believing’ mental verb in the witness’s turns, 
i.e. sądzić, it behaved in a manner resembling that of the most common Eng-
lish epistemic verb, i.e. think. When used in the matrix clause, as in (17), 
sądzę, że (‘I think that’) conveyed the speaker’s strong belief. When used par-
enthetically, in turn, as in (18), jak sądzę (‘..., I think,...’) marked lower cer-
tainty (even more so given the co-occurring hedges chyba (‘probably’) and 
jeśli dobrze pamiętam (‘if I remember this correctly’)). Finally, when used 
as a neg-raiser, nie sądzę (‘I don’t think’) signalled lower certainty as well 
(as in 19).
11  This may be seen as a conscious evasive strategy designed to diminish the witness’s re-
sponsibility or simply attributed to Mr Tusk’s incomplete memory, which would also be under-
standable given that fact that the events described during the hearing took place eight years 
prior to the questioning.
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Table 1. ‘Believing’ mental verbs in the witness’s testimony
Mental verbs Frequency
myślę (‘I think’) 2
podejrzewam (‘I suspect’) 1
przypuszczam (‘I suppose’) 0
rozumiem (‘I understand’)12 4
sądzę (‘I think’/‘I am of the opinion’)
nie sądzę (‘I don’t think’)
14
14
spodziewam się (‘I expect’) 0
uważam (‘I think’/‘I am of the opinion’) 0
wątpię (‘I doubt’) 0
widzę13 (‘I (can) see’)
nie widzę (‘I don’t see’) [non-literal meaning]14
0
1
wierzę (‘I believe’) 0
zakładam (‘I assume’) 1
(17)  Sądzę, że organizacją lotu zajmował się pułk, ja się nie interesowałem tym, kto się 
zajmuje organizacją lotu.
(‘I think that the organisation of the flight was being taken care of by the regiment, 
I was not interested in who was organising the flight.’)
(18)  i tak należy zrozumieć wizytę Prezydenta 10 kwietnia, bo taką ostateczną datę 
przyjął, i zaproponował chyba, jak sądzę, jeśli dobrze pamiętam minister Przewoźnik 
jako datę tych uroczystości
(‘and this is how one should understand the President’s visit on the 10th of April 
because this was the final date approved and suggested by, probably, I think, if I 
remember this correctly, Minister Przewoźnik, as the date of the ceremony’)
(19)  Nie sądzę, żebym wtedy znał te dokumenty, nie interesowałem się tą stroną mojej 
aktywności
(‘I don’t think that I knew the documents back then, I was not interested in this 
aspect of my activity’)
12 Interestingly, 11 more instances were found in the turns of other participants seeking 
confirmation of their assessments.
13 The verb widzieć (‘see’) allows for two interpretations: literal and non-literal. The literal 
meaning of widzę (‘I can see’) marks certainty, while its non-literal meaning (‘I see’/‘as I see’/‘as 
I understand’) marks belief rather than certainty. Consider two possible interpretations of the 
utterance: Widzę, że nie jesteś zadowolony ze swojej pracy (‘I see that you’re not happy with 
your job’), i.e. 1) literal meaning, direct evidentiality, reference to perception and to what the 
speaker can see with his/her eyes; 2) non-literal meaning, inferential evidentiality, the speaker’s 
inference/evaluation. Similar observations can be made, for instance, about Russian ja vizhu or 
German (wie) ich sehe.
14 Only one instance of the literal meaning of widzę was identified in the data, i.e. in a de-
scription of out-of-the-courtroom reality (in Mr Tusk’s clarification regarding his co-operation 
with an interpreter during interpreter-mediated talks).
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Similarly, low certainty and little commitment were encoded in the phrases 
wydaje mi się (‘it seems to me’) and wydaje się (‘it seems’), both of which rep-
resent the ‘I believe p’ variant.
(20)  bardzo mi przykro że nie zawsze mogę tu służyć swoją pamięcią, ale wydaje się, że 
bezproblemowo można to po prostu stwierdzić
(‘I am very sorry that I may not always rely on my memory here, but it seems that 
without difficulty one may simply ascertain this’)
(21) Wysoki Sądzie wydaje mi się, że problem powinniśmy trochę inaczej zdefiniować.
(‘Your Honour, it seems to me that the problem should be defined somewhat 
differently.’)
The tentativeness of the speaker’s assessment was also expressed by way of 
hypothetical sentences, as in (22), where Mr Tusk speculates that he would re-
member it if someone had warned him against flying to Smoleńsk. Specula-
tive judgments can too be seen in (23) and (24), including, respectively, the 
approximator gdzieś w okolicach (‘somewhere near’) and the future form to 
będzie (‘this will be’).
(22) Ale nikt, ale na pewno pamiętałbym gdyby ktoś mówił... może jednak nie leć, bo...
(‘But no one, but for sure I would remember it if anyone had said.. you’d better not 
fly after all because…’)
(23) no trzeba ją lokować gdzieś w okolicach początku lutego
(‘well, you should situate it somewhere near the beginning of February’)
(24) To, co mam w pamięci to będzie, jak sądzę, początek roku, raczej styczeń
(‘What I can remember that will be, I think, the beginning of the year, probably 
January’)
To sum up, the Believing position was reducible either to “I believe p” (e.g. wy- 
daje mi się (‘it seems to me’)) or “I don’t know whether p [or non p]” (e.g. 
nie jestem pewien (‘I am not sure’)). The most common markers included 
the mental verb sądzić (‘think’), various constructions marking possibility or 
probability as well as phrases stressing the witness’s limited knowledge, among 
which references to his incomplete memory were most visible (for examples, see 
Figure 3).
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(ja) rozumiem, że (‘I understand that’)
myślę, że (‘I think (that)’)
nie sądzę (‘I don’t think’)
…,  jak sądzę, … (‘…, I think, ...’)
wydaje się (‘it seems’)
wydaje mi się (‘it seems to me’)
jest możliwe (‘it is possible’)
jest prawdopodobne (‘it is probable’)
ale nie ma tu pewności (‘but it is not certain’)
musi być (‘there must be’)
to, co mam w pamięci (‘what I can remember’/’[what I have in my memory])
nie jestem pewien (‘I am not sure’)
pewnie (‘probably’)
przynajmniej z mojego punktu widzenia (‘at least from my point of view’)
powołuję się na mój zdrowy rozsądek  i logikę (‘I use my common sense and logic’)
chyba (‘probably’/‘…, I think, …’)
jakby (‘in a way’/‘as if’)
jeśli mam w pamięci (‘if I remember’/[if I have it in my memory]’)
pamiętałbym (‘I would remember’)
gdzieś w okolicach (‘somewhere near’)
jakieś (‘some’)
to będzie (‘that will be’)
Figure 3. Selected markers of the Believing position identified in the data
3.2.4. Co-occurrence of KUB markers
Given that in naturally occurring data epistemic markers tend to cluster, to see 
what work they really do in discourse, the analyst needs to consider them in 
a broader interactional context. When decontextualised, these markers can be 
easily identified as indexing Knowing, Unknowing, or Believing stances. In the 
environment of other epistemic items, however, they acquire new, pragmatic 
meanings which result from their interplay with the co-occurring elements.
This observation is especially relevant to the courtroom setting, where the 
discourse participants carefully craft their responses bearing in mind their ac-
countability to the judicial authority and the fact that the testimony is provid-
ed under oath. In the case study analysed here, the witness deliberately cre-
ates an air of uncertainty and frequently admits to ‘unknowledge,’ as if trying 
to forestall future attacks from political opponents who might want to rely on 
his words uttered in court. To see this more clearly, consider the interaction-
al sequences shown in (25) and (26). The witness’s responses, though made 
up of divergent ‘little’ stances, create the overall impression of uncertainty, 
that is Believing. The great accumulation of  ‘knowing,’ ‘unknowing’ and ‘be-
lieving’ markers within one turn appears to be a conscious hedging strategy 
through which the witness wishes to decrease the illocutionary force of the 
whole utterance. If, conversely, an affirmative response were provided to 
the confirmation-seeking question in (25), Mr Tusk would unequivocally admit 
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to being unaware of any disciplinary action being taken against his subordi-
nates. As it currently stands, the circuitous response Mr Tusk gives may not be 
assigned a truth-value. In line with the KUB model, the question is asked from 
the Believing position, awaiting a Knowing answer, and getting a Believing 
one instead.
(25)  Q: Czyli odpowiadając na pytanie prokuratora, nic Pan nie wie o tym, aby osoby te 
były jakoś dyscyplinarnie ukarane za jakiekolwiek nieprawidłowości? 
(‘So, answering the prosecutor’s question, you do not know anything about these 
people being subject to any disciplinary action for any irregularities?’)
[confirmation-seeking question – BELIEVING position]
A: Zdziwiłbym się gdyby tak było, [B] ale Wysoki Sądzie mogę tylko powtórzyć, [K] 
ponieważ że byłem wówczas skoncentrowany na innych sprawach, więc ja naprawdę 
nie mogę wykluczyć, [U] że tego typu zdarzenia mogły umknąć mojej pamięci, [B] 
ale wydaje mi się mało prawdopodobne, [B] a na pewno ja nie miałem krytycznej 
oceny [K] i nie mam do dziś krytycznej oceny działań ministra Arabskiego [K]. 
[BELIEVING position]
(‘I would be surprised if it had been the case, [B] but, Your Honour, I can only 
reiterate this [K], because back then I focused my attention on other matters, so 
I really cannot rule out the possibility [U] that such events could have escaped 
my memory, [B], but it seems unlikely to me, [B], and I certainly did not criti-
cally assess [K] and I still do not critically assess Minister Arabski’s activities [K]’) 
[BELIEVING position]
In a similar vein, in (26), the witness masterfully avoids giving a succinct, 
straight-to-the-point answer and opts for something more convoluted instead. 
While meandering between Knowing, Unknowing and Believing ‘little’ stanc-
es, he succeeds, again, in conveying the impression of having uncertain knowl-
edge. In this exchange, the question is asked from the Unknowing position, 
awaiting a Knowing answer, and getting a Believing one instead.
(26)  Q: Świadek niedawno na pytanie Pani mecenas, odnośnie czy był przeprowadzony jakiś 
audyt po śmierci Prezydenta i całej delegacji, odpowiedział, że byłby zaskoczony gdyby 
taki audyt był zrobiony, co świadek miał na myśli? Dlaczego byłoby to zaskoczenie? 
(‘Not so long ago, in the response to the counsel’s question asking whether an audit 
was carried out after the death of the President and the whole delegation, you [the 
witness] said that you would be surprised if such an audit had been carried out, 
what did you [the witness] mean by that? Why would you find it surprising?’)
[information-seeking question – UNKNOWING position]
A: Wysoki Sądzie tylko to miałem na myśli, że nie zachowałem tego w pamięci, 
(U) więc byłbym zaskoczony, [B] bo pewnie bym o tym wiedział, [B] ale nie mogę 
tego wykluczyć [U] także ze względu na atmosferę tamtych dni. Też wydaje się, [B] 
Wysoki Sądzię, ale wiem, [K] że to nie jest moją rolą, ale to jest też chyba łatwe do 
stwierdzenia, [B] no bo z natury rzeczy to są rzeczy dokumentowane, [K] bardzo 
mi przykro, że nie zawsze mogę tu służyć swoją pamięcią, [U] ale wydaje się, [B] że 
bezproblemowo można to po prostu stwierdzić [B].
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(‘Your Honour, I only meant that I couldn’t remember it, [U], so I would be sur-
prised, [B], because I would probably know this, [B] but I cannot rule out this 
possibility, [U] also because of the atmosphere on those days. It also seems, [B] 
Your Honour, but I know [K] that this is not my role, but this is also probably easy 
to establish [B], since, well, these things are by their very nature documented, 
[K], I am very sorry that I may not always rely on my memory here, [U] but it 
seems [B] that without difficulty one may simply ascertain this [B].’)
[BELIEVING position]
To sum up, what the above excerpts demonstrate is that how speakers 
communicate (un)knowledge in competitive or confrontational settings can 
sometimes be very complex and that the various degrees of (un)certainty 
can sometimes be less-than-straightforward. This results from the pragmatic 
motivations speakers have and the perlocutionary effect they want to achieve.4. Conclusions
Based on the foregoing study, several observations can be made. These have 
been summarised below.
1.  The KUB model appears to be a useful tool for conceptualising epistemic 
stance in spoken interaction. It encourages the analyst to view individual lexi-
cal and grammatical markers as vehicles for Knowing, Unknowing or Believ-
ing. It conveniently proposes, on the one hand, the Knowing/Unknowing di-
vide, and on the other, the Believing position, which subsumes the meaning of 
“believing p” (possibility/probability) and “not knowing whether p [or non p]” 
(uncertainty). Since the KUB model reduces epistemic stance to these three 
positions, it lifts from the analyst the burden of assigning varied degrees of cer-
tainty/uncertainty and possibility/probability. It should however be admitted 
that assignment of the three positions is much easier in the case of isolated or 
decontextualised items. Naturally occurring data, by contrast, abound in co-
occurrences of ‘certain’ and ‘uncertain’ markers, with speakers shifting stances 
within their turns. This makes the analysis more challenging, as the overall de-
gree of (un)certainty communicated by the speaker may differ from the degree 
of (un)certainty conveyed by individual markers.
2. In high-stake encounters such as, e.g., courtroom hearings and politi-
cal speeches or interviews, speakers may intentionally declare to know less 
than they really do or, conversely, create the impression of being more knowl-
edgeable than they really are to promote their own interests. Since the ana-
lyst has no access to the speaker’s mental state at the moment of speaking, he/
she needs to remember that the linguistic realisation is the speaker’s display of 
knowledge and not necessarily an accurate representation of their mental state. 
This should be borne in mind especially with regard to institutional settings 
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where the interactants negotiate their epistemic rights and epistemic priority, 
and where they consciously project the preferred self-image.
3. In the data under study, perhaps for the reasons described above, the wit-
ness chose not to admit to (un)knowledge with explicit markers such as wiem 
(‘I know’) and nie wiem (‘I don’t know’). Instead, he invoked his incomplete memo-
ry using numerous phrases with the noun pamięć (‘memory’) and the verb pamiętać 
(‘remember’), all of which could be reduced to “I don’t remember” or “If I remem-
ber p correctly.” Thus, many of the utterances produced by the witness could not be 
assigned a truth-value. This – along with other distancing mechanisms (e.g. using 
structures with object and possessive pronouns instead of verbs in the first person 
singular) – allowed the witness to decrease the illocutionary force of his statements 
and thus to reduce his agency in the eyes of political opponents.
4. The data also revealed that mental verbs were not the witness’s preferred 
way of expressing epistemic assessments. This applies not only to common 
mental verbs such as przypuszczam (‘I suppose’) or podejrzewam (‘I suspect’), 
but also to the Polish equivalents of English I think, that is myślę and sądzę. 
With 28 tokens, (nie) sądzę (‘I (don’t) think’) was, admittedly, the most fre-
quent mental verb used by the witness; however, myślę (‘I think’) was identi-
fied only twice. This is in agreement with Wierzbicka’s (2006: 37) observation 
that the “spectacularly” frequent English I think is much less common in oth-
er languages (e.g. German, Dutch or Swedish). Worthy of note is also the fact 
that while English I think functions like a discourse marker or modal particle 
(cf. Aijmer 1997), the Polish verb myślę does not. In the current study, it might 
be the case that the witness consciously avoided the high commitment encod-
ed in verbs in the first person singular, and opted for such structures which in-
dexed greater epistemic distance. Also, a plausible explanation for the virtual 
non-existence of myślę in the witness’s turns, which is in stark contrast to his 
use of sadzę, is that myślę can be seen as carrying the meaning of “cogitation” 
while sądzę can be interpreted as “holding an opinion.” Naturally, it is the sec-
ond meaning that is more relevant to the courtroom examination context.
5. Finally, though it is a rather unsurprising observation, the study dem-
onstrates that the communication of knowledge – and, by extension, human 
communication in general –  is a complex  phenomenon and that no single 
model of analysis can account for all its facets and realisations. This concerns 
also – or perhaps above all – the epistemics of institutional interaction.References
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‘Knowing,’ ‘unknowing’ and ‘believing’ markers in spoken Polish155
EPISTEMIC 
STANCE





Unqualified declarative sentences Rozmowy między przywódcami, jeśli mają charakter formalny i są 
notowane, protokołowane, mają też rangę dokumentów. 
(‘Talks between leaders, if they are formal and if they are being 
recorded, evidenced, they also have the status of documents.’)
Lexical and grammatical markers
Declarative 
sentences
‘Knowing’ mental verbs + first-person singular 
or plural (e.g. wiem/znam (‘I know’), widzę (‘I 
(can) see’)17, pamiętamy (‘we remember’))
Wiem z racji kontekstu i wiem, z jakiego tytułu są one wymienione, ale 
nie kojarzę bezpośrednio z twarzą, czy z funkcją. 
(‘I know because of the context and I know on what account they are 
mentioned, but I cannot recall exactly their faces or functions.’)
155  This classification of epistemic markers in spoken Polish was inspired by the KUB taxonomy proposed by Zuczkowski and Bongelli (2014) and Bon-
gelli and Riccioni (2018) analysing English and Italian data. The original classification has, however, been substantially extended and modified to suit Polish 
linguistic material. The list does not purport to be exhaustive.
16 Three comments should be made here: 1/ The examples come from the turns of all the participants in the hearing, and not just from Donald Tusk’s 
turns which were the main focus of the analysis; therefore, they include both declarative sentences and questions; 2/ To be properly interpreted, the exam-
ples shown for illustrative purposes should be considered in the original context in which they were identified. It should be stressed as well that since the 
individual epistemic markers frequently co-occurred, the degree of certainty/uncertainty communicated by the whole utterance resulted from the interplay 
of the co-occurring markers and, therefore, it often differed from the degree of certainty/uncertainty conveyed by decontextualised items; 3/ Most of the 
English translations provided include equivalent rather congruent structures, i.e. those that do not contain the same number and order of grammatical 
constituents as their Polish counterparts. They are intended as idiomatic (and pragmatically relevant) English equivalents of the Polish epistemic markers 
rather than verbatim translations.  
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‘Certain’ communication verbs + first-
person singular or plural (e.g. mówię (‘I 
say’/‘I’m saying’), twierdzimy (‘we say/claim’), 
potwierdzam (“I can confirm’))
ale powtarzam ono [spotkanie] było protokołowane 
(‘but as I’m saying, it [the meeting] was being recorded’)
‘Certain’ adjectives + first-person singular 
or plural (e.g. jestem pewien (‘I am certain/
sure/positive’), jesteśmy przekonani (‘we are 
convinced’))
Jestem przekonany, że tak, ale od jeszcze raz powtórzę, Wysoki Sądzie, że 
rolą premiera nie jest znajomość tysięcy … 
(‘I am convinced that there was, from, but as I’m saying, Your Honour, 
it is not the role of the Prime Minister to know thousands of…’)
Phrases with ‘knowing’ nouns + first-person 
singular or plural (e.g. mam pewność (‘‘I am 
certain’/I have certitude’), mam świadomość (‘I 
am aware (of)’/‘I have awareness (of)’))
…że z faktu, że mam świadomość, że minister Arabski był szefem 
kancelarii… 
(‘… that from the fact that I am aware of the fact that Minister Arabski 
was the head of the chancellery…’)
Negation of ‘uncertain’ verbs + first-person 
singular or plural (e.g. nie wątpię (‘I have no 
doubt’))
NO DATA
Negation of ‘uncertain’ nouns + first-person 
singular or plural (e.g. nie mam wątpliwości 
(‘I have no doubt’))
ale nie mam żadnych wątpliwości, Wysoki Sądzie, i prosiłbym o 
zrozumienie, że to w jaki sposób te mechanizmy działały, na pewno jest 
szczegółowo opisane w dokumentacji 
(‘but I have no doubt whatsoever, Your Honour, and I ask for your 
understanding, that the way in which these procedures worked is 
certainly described in detail in the documentation.’)
Impersonal structures with ‘certain’ 
adjectives (e.g. jest pewne (‘it is certain’), jest 
niezaprzeczalne (‘it is undeniable’))
NO DATA
Phrases with ‘certain’ nouns 
(e.g. istnieje pewność (‘it is certain’))
NO DATA
‘Knowing’ verbs + object pronouns mi/mnie/
nam (e.g. wiadomo mi/nam, że (‘I am/we are 





‘Certain’ adverbials (e.g. z (całą) pewnością 
(‘surely’/‘certainly’), na pewno (‘certainly’), 
bez wątpienia/niewątpliwie (‘undoubtedly’/’no 
doubt’))
i tam na pewno wątki te historyczne się pojawiały 
(‘and there these historical themes were certainly present’)
References to shared epistemic background 
(common knowledge) (e.g. wiadomo (‘it 
is known’), wszyscy wiedzą (‘everybody 
knows’), wszyscy wiemy (‘all of us know’), 
oczywiście (‘of course’), z oczywistych względów 
(‘for obvious reasons’), jak wiadomo (‘as is 
known’), powszechnie wiadomo (‘it is common 
knowledge’))
w tym sensie była to wiedza natychmiast publiczna i potoczna. 
(‘in this sense it was immediately public and common knowledge’)
no bo z natury rzeczy to są rzeczy dokumentowane 
(‘because by their very nature these things are documented’)
natomiast jest oczywiste, że w polskim ustroju politycznym urzędnicy 
państwowi są powołani do wykonywania funkcji wyłącznie w ramach 
prawa 
(‘however it is obvious that in the Polish political system public officials 
are appointed to perform their functions only in accordance with the 
law’)
Epistemic future (e.g. powiem (‘I will say’)) te kontakty są częstsze, ale mają charakter taki, powiem, bardzo 
rutynowy podkreślam nie polegają na tym, że ktoś kogoś nie odstępuję na 
krok. 
(‘this co-operation is more frequent, but it is, I will say, very much 
like a routine, as I’m saying, it is not the case that one person follows 
another round all the time’)
Questions ‘Knowing’ rhetorical questions (e.g. Czyż nie 











Lexical and grammatical markers
Declarative 
sentences
Negation of ‘knowing’ mental verbs + first- 
-person singular or plural (e.g. nie wiem/nie 
znam (‘I don’t know’), nie widzę (‘I can’t see’)18, 
nie wiemy (‘we don’t know’), nie pamiętam 
(‘I don’t remember’), nie przypominam sobie 
(‘I cannot recall’))
Nie przypominam sobie,  aby przed lutym tego typu opracowania stały 
się co najmniej przynajmniej mojej lektury… 
(‘I cannot recall such papers becoming, before February, at least, at 
least [I cannot recall] my reading…’)
Negation of ‘knowing’ communication verbs 
+ first-person singular or plural (e.g. nie 
potwierdzam (‘I can’t confirm’))
Nie potwierdzam tej wypowiedzi 
(‘I cannot confirm these words’)
Negation + possessive adjective mój/moja + 
‘knowing’ nouns + (e.g. nie jest w mojej wiedzy 
(‘not to my knowledge’), nie jest w mojej pamięci 
(‘I don’t remember’))
 nie jest w mojej wiedzy nic, co uprawniałoby mnie do oceny pracy 
(‘I am not aware of anything that would entitle me to assess the work 
of...’ [literal translation: ‘it is not my knowledge …’])
Negation of ‘certain’ nouns + first-person 
singular or plural (e.g. nie mam wiedzy 
(‘I don’t have any knowledge ’/ ‘I am not aware’), 
nie mam świadomości (‘I am not aware’/‘I am 
not cognizant of ’), nie mam w pamięci (‘I cannot 
remember’))
Nie mam w pamięci niczego takiego 
(‘I don’t remember anything like this’ [literal translation: ‘I do not have 
it in my memory’)
 
Negation of móc + first-person singular or 
plural + communication verb 
(e.g. nie mogę tego potwierdzić (‘I cannot confirm 
this’), nie mogę stwierdzić (‘I am not able to 
ascertain’), nie mogę zaprzeczyć (‘I cannot deny’), 
nie mogę wykluczyć (‘I cannot rule out [the 
possibility of/that]’))
więc ja nie mogę wykluczyć, że minister Przewoźnik dopóki nie 
było pełnej jednoznacznej deklaracji ze strony obu kancelarii, mógł 
przygotować takie warianty 
(‘so I cannot rule out the possibility that Minister Przewoźnik, as long 
as no all-encompassing unequivocal declaration was made by both 
chancelleries, that he could have prepared such alternatives’)
18 Cf. footnote 13.
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Impersonal  structures with ‘unknowing’ verbs 
(e.g. nie wiadomo (‘it is unknown’/‘one doesn’t 
know’), nie widać (‘one cannot see’/‘you don’t 
see’), nie mówi się nic o (‘one doesn’t say anything 
about’))
NO DATA
‘Unknowing’ verbs + object pronouns mi/mnie/
nam (e.g. nie jest mi/nam nic wiadomo,  
(‘I/we are not aware’/‘I/we know nothing 
[about]’))
Mi też nie jest łatwo ocenić, co pamiętam 
(‘I also find it difficult to assess what I remember’ [literal translation: 
‘It is not easy for me either to assess what I remember’)
Epistemic future (negation + ‘knowing’ verb) 
(e.g. tego nie będę wiedzieć (‘I won’t know’), nie 
powiem (‘I won’t say’/‘I don’t know’))
Szczegółów sobie nie przypomnę 
(‘I will not be able to recall the details’) 
Nie powiem 
(‘I won’t say’ = ‘I don’t know’)
Questions ‘Unknowing’ questions with interrogative 
pronouns (e.g. Kto ….? (‘Who..?’), Co…? 
(‘What…?’), Gdzie …? (‘Where…?’), Kiedy…? 
(‘When…?’), Jak…? (‘How?’))
Wh-question [information-seeking question]
Kiedy Pan powziął decyzję, że będzie uczestniczył w tych obchodach 
w Katyniu? 
(‘When did you decide that you would participate in this 




ing or Believing? Epistemic Stance in Donald Tusk’s Testimony…
BELIEVING 
(uncertain) 
[I believe p] 




Lexical and grammatical markers
Declarative 
sentences
‘Believing’ mental verbs + first-person singular 
or plural (e.g. sądzę (‘I think’/’I’m of the 
opinion’), myślę (‘I think’), uważam 
(‘I believe’/‘I’m of the opinion’), rozumiem 
(‘I understand’/‘I see’), podejrzewam (‘I suspect’), 
widzę (‘I see’)19)
ja rozumiem, że świadek nie był nigdy w Katyniu 
(‘I understand that you [the witness] have never been to Katyń’)
Myślę, że termin „rozdzielenie wizyt” był terminem publicystycznym, czy 
politycznym raczej 
(‘I think that the description “separation of visits” was a journalistic 
description, or rather a political one’)
Ale widzę, że przedstawiciele rodzin są bardzo zdenerwowani, również 
mój mocodawca i chciałbym udzielić im w tym momencie… 
(‘But I see that the families’ representatives are very upset, also my 
principal, and I would like to give them the right to, at the moment…’)
‘Uncertain’ mental verbs + first-person 
singular or plural (e.g. wątpię (‘I doubt’))
NO DATA
‘Believing’ mental verbs + neg-raising 
(e.g. nie sądzę (‘I don’t think’), nie uważam 
(‘I don’t think’), nie przypuszczam (‘I don’t 
suppose’))
Nie sądzę, abyśmy w czasie tego spotkania poruszali precyzyjnie możliwy 
przebieg takiego takiej wizyty 
(‘I don’t think we were, during this meeting, discussing in detail the 
possible course of this this visit’)
Phrases with ‘believing’ nouns + first-person 
singular or plural (e.g. mam wątpliwość (‘I have 
doubts/‘I doubt’))
NO DATA
Negation + ‘knowing’ nouns/verbs + p1 or 
p2 (e.g. nie wiem, czy p1 czy p2 (‘I don’t know 
whether p1 or p2’), nie jest w mojej pamięci, czy p1 
czy p2 (‘I don’t remember whether p1 or p2’), nie 
jest mi/nam wiadomo, czy p1 czy p2 (‘I/we don’t 
know whether p1 or p2’))
NO DATA
19 Cf. footnote 13.
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Jak-comment clauses (e.g. jak sądzę (‘I think’/‘as 
I think’), jak wierzę (‘I believe’/‘as I believe’))
I to, jak sądzę, ministra Przewoźnika skłaniało do tego, żeby szukać 
różnych wariantów 
(‘And this, I think, made Minister Przewoźnik look for various 
alternatives’)
Impersonal  structures with mental and 
communication verbs (e.g. sądzi się/uważa się 
(‘one believes’/‘it is believed’), widać (‘one can 
see’), wydaje się (‘it seems’/‘it appears’), mówi 
się (‘they say’), wydają się/zdają się (‘they seem/
appear to’))
natomiast zaproszenie telefoniczne wydaje się w zupełności wystarczające 
z punktu widzenia praktyki 
(‘however a telephone invitation seems more than sufficient from the 
point of view of practice’) 
Impersonal  structures with ‘believing’ 
adjectives (e.g. jest (wysoce) prawdopodobne 
(‘it is (highly) likely/probable’), jest możliwe, 
że (‘it is possible that’))
dałem zielone światło urzędnikom, mówiąc, że, czy zakładając, że jest 
możliwe, prawdopodobne, że będę w Katyniu 
(‘I gave the green light to the officials, saying or assuming that it was 
possible, probable that I would be in Katyń’) 
Negation + ‘certain’ nouns (e.g. nie ma pewności 
(‘it is not certain’))
poza właściwie jednym stwierdzeniem, że prezydent Kaczyński być może 
będzie chciał brać udział, ale nie ma tu pewności, w uroczystościach. 
(‘apart from one statement that President Kaczyński will perhaps want 
to take part, but it is not certain, in the ceremony’)
Phrases with ‘hearsay’ nouns (e.g. krążą 
pogłoski (‘there are rumours’), były plotki (‘there 
was gossip’), płyną sygnały (‘one hears’))
takie sygnały pojawiały się pod koniec 2009 roku 
(‘such statements appeared at the end of 2009’)
‘Believing’ verbs + object pronouns mi/mnie/
nam (e.g. wydaje mi/nam się  (‘it seems/appears 
to me/us’), mnie się wydaje (‘it seems/appears to 
me’))
więc w tym sensie, Wysoki Sądzie, wydaje mi się, że nie ma jakby, nie ma 
możliwości odpowiedzenia twierdząco na Pańskie pytanie 
(‘so in this sense, Your Honour, it seems to me that there is, in a way, no 
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Modal verbs (e.g. może/mogą (‘can’/’may’), 
mógłby/mogliby (‘could’/’might’), musi/muszą 
(‘must’))
ale na całym świecie wiadomo, że tego typu zachowania na pokładzie 
samolotu, czy przed lotem mogą doprowadzić do tragedii… 
(‘but it is known worldwide that this kind of behaviour onboard a plane 
or before a flight may lead to a catastrophe ..’)
Z całą pewnością musi być notatka z rozmowy… 
(‘Most certainly there must be a note documenting the conversation..’)
Phrases with markers of limited (uncertain/
unconfirmed) knowledge (e.g. wedle/według 
mojej wiedzy (‘based on my knowledge’), o ile mi 
wiadomo (‘as far as I know’/‘for all I know’), 
z tego, co pamiętam (‘as far as I remember’), mam 
w pamięci (‘I can remember’), wiem tylko 
(‘all I know is’))
o ile sądowi wiadomo 
(‘as far as the court is aware’)
te ostateczne decyzje to według mojej pamięci zarówno jeśli chodzi o 
mnie, jak i o prezydenta Lecha Kaczyńskiego, to był luty, a nie styczeń 
(‘these final decisions, as far as I remember/[basing on my memory], 
as regards both myself and President Lech Kaczyński, it was February 
and not January.’)
To, co mam w pamięci to będzie, jak sądzę, początek roku, raczej styczeń 
(‘What I can remember/[what I have in my memory] that will be, 
I think, the beginning of the year, probably January.’)
Negation of ‘certain’ adjectives and nouns + 
first-person singular or plural (e.g. nie jestem 
pewien (‘I am not certain/sure/positive’), nie 
jestem przekonany (‘I am not convinced’))
Nie jestem pewien, Wysoki Sądzie, czy usatysfakcjonuje  zadającego  to 
pytanie 
(‘I am not sure, Your Honour, if it satisfies the questioner…’)
‘Uncertain’ adverbials 
(e.g. (być) może (‘maybe’), pewnie (‘probably’), 
prawdopodobnie (‘probably’), najwyraźniej 
(‘clearly’), najwidoczniej (‘apparently’), chyba 
(‘probably’))
więc byłbym zaskoczony, bo pewnie bym o tym wiedział, ale nie mogę 
tego wykluczyć 
(‘so I would be surprised because I would probably have known about 
this, but I cannot rule out this possibility’)
ale to jest też chyba łatwe do stwierdzenia 
(‘but this is also, I think/probably, easy to ascertain’)
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Hypotheticals/conditional mood (e.g. jeśli/
jeżeli (‘if ’), tak jakby/jakoby (‘as if ’/‘as though’), 
niejako (‘in a way’/‘as if ’))
Była to jakby bezproduktywna i niepotrzebna wizyta 
(‘This was, as if/in a way, an unproductive and unnecessary visit’)
że jeśli mam w pamięci jakieś rozmowy z Tomaszem Arabskim, to 
związane one były raczej z tymi … 
(‘that if I remember some conversations with Tomasz Arabski, they 
were related, I think, to those …’)
Approximators (e.g. gdzieś 
(‘somewhere’/‘approximately’), jakieś (‘some’))
że jeśli mam w pamięci jakieś rozmowy z Tomaszem Arabskim to 
związane one były raczej z tymi … 
(‘that if I remember some conversations with Tomasz Arabski, they 
were related, I think, to those …’)
Epistemic future (e.g. to będzie (‘that will be’)) To, co mam w pamięci, to będzie, jak sądzę, początek roku, raczej styczeń 
(‘What I can remember that will be, I think, the beginning of the year, 
probably January’)
Questions ‘Believing’ questions (alternative questions, 






Alternative question [information-seeking question] 
Czy takie tematy były poruszane, czy nie były? 
(‘Were such subjects raised or were they not?’)
Polar (yes/no) question [information-seeking question] 
Czy istniał taki dokument? 
(‘Did such a document exist?’)
Tag question [confirmation-seeking question] 
To znaczy takie zdarzenia nigdy nie miały miejsca, tak? 
(‘That is such events never took place, is that right?)
Declarative question [confirmation-seeking question] 
Rozumiem, że wtedy na Westerplatte w Gdańsku, w Sopocie 
nie było mowy o obchodach 70. rocznicy w Katyniu? 
(‘I understand that back then at Westerplatte in Gdańsk, 
in Sopot there was no talk of the commemoration of the 
70th anniversary in Katyń?)
